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Abstract— Pursuit and evasion conflicts represent challeng-
ing problems with important applications in aerospace and
robotics. In pursuit-evasion problems, synthesis of intelligent
actions must consider the adversary’s potential strategies.
Differential game theory provides an adequate framework to
analyze possible outcomes of the conflict without assuming
particular behaviors by the opponent. This article presents
an organized introduction of pursuit-evasion differential games
with an overview of recent advances in the area. First, a
summary of the seminal work is outlined, highlighting impor-
tant contributions. Next, more recent results are described by
employing a classification based on the number of players:
one-pursuer-one-evader, N-pursuers-one-evader, one-pursuer-
M-evaders, and N-pursuer-M-evader games. In each scenario,
a brief summary of the literature is presented. Finally, two
representative pursuit-evasion differential games are studied in
detail: the two-cutters and fugitive ship differential game and
the active target defense differential game. These problems
provide two important applications and, more importantly,
they give great insight into the realization of cooperation
between friendly agents in order to form a team and defeat
the adversary.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pursuit-evasion problems provide a general framework
that mathematically formalizes important applications in
different areas such as surveillance, navigation, analysis of
biological behaviors, and conflict and combat operations.
Pursuit-evasion sets up (in the simplest case) two players or
autonomous agents against each other; generalizations are
typical in the sense of multiple players divided into two
teams – the pursuer team against the evader team. The main
purpose is to provide strategies that enable an autonomous
agent to perform a set of actions against the opponent, for
instance, the pursuer aims at determining a strategy that will
result in capture or interception of the evader.
It is common to approach pursuit-evasion problems by
imposing certain assumptions on the behavior of the op-
ponent [1], [2]. However, many pursuit-evasion scenarios
must address the presence of an intelligent adversary which
does not abide by a restricted set of actions. The desire
to design strategies that optimize a certain criterion against
the worst possible actions of the opponent and that also
provide robustness with respect to all possible behaviors
of the same opponent, led to the emergence of differential
game theory [3]. The central problem in pursuit-evasion
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differential games is the synthesis of saddle-point strategies
that provide guaranteed performance for each team regardless
of the actual strategies implemented by the adversary.
This paper serves as an introduction into the area of
two-team pursuit-evasion differential games with a focus on
multi-player problems, that is, games with three or more
players where team cooperation is implicitly required. An
outline of seminal work on the area of differential games
which highlights important contributions and potential appli-
cations is given in Section II. This is followed by an overview
of important contributions in the field using a suitable
categorization based on number of players in Section III.
Cooperation between agents of the same team is emphasized
both in theoretical and practical terms. From a theoretical
point of view, the saddle-point solution of a differential game
with multiple players in one or both teams requires the
strictest level of cooperation. From a practical perspective,
cooperation improves team performance compared to the
individual efforts. The paper culminates with two represen-
tative case studies in Sections IV and V which illustrate
both the tools available to synthesize and verify optimal
strategies and the important cooperation aspect within multi-
player differential games.
II. SEMINAL WORK
The development of differential games started with the
works of [3]–[8]. In these publications, Isaacs outlined
the idea of posing problems in a dynamic game-theoretic
framework; he called this paradigm “Differential Games”.
In his seminal treatise [3], Isaacs employed the principles of
game theory, calculus of variations, and control theory, albeit
unknown to him, to solve problems involving a dynamic
conflict between multiple agents/players, [3]. Isaacs used the
method of differential dynamic programming and introduced
critical mathematical constructs such as dispersal, universal,
and equivocal surfaces used to describe the optimal flow field
in games and derive optimal saddle point strategies.
It is important to recognize some of the founders of
static/dynamic games and optimal control including RAND
scientists such as Richard E. Bellman, Leonard D. Berkovitz,
David H. Blackwell, Melvin Dresher, Wendell H. Flemming,
and John F. Nash. Early contributions on dynamic games in
the former Soviet Union were published by N. Krasovskii,
A. Melikyan, L. S. Pontryagin, and A. I. Subbotin [9].
Furthermore, at the first conference dedicated exclusively
to dynamic games: “First International Conference on the
Theory and Applications of Differential Games” in Amherst,
MA, September 29-October 1, 1969, organized by Ho and
Leitmann. Isaacs, Berkovitz, Bernhardt, Blaquiere, Break-
well, Case, Friedman, Merz, Pontryagin, and Shubik were
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among the invited speakers. Although Pontraygin was not
able to attend the meeting, these mathematicians and scien-
tists planted the seeds of the theory of optimal control and
differential games.
Of a large number of mathematicians and scientists which
were involved in the development of differential games,
Rufus Isaacs, Richard Bellman, John Breakwell, and Lev
Pontryagin can be seen as principal contributors to the devel-
opment of the theory of differential games; Isaacs being the
father of Differential Games. His seminal work and his book
highlighted the possible use of differential games to solve
many problems, [3], [4]. Bellman, known for the method of
dynamic programming, provided a tool whereby state feed-
back optimal strategies could be directly obtained as opposed
to methods based on necessary conditions as is the calculus
of variations, [10], [11]. Pontryagin, a Soviet mathematician,
is recognized as developing his Maximum Principle (We’ll
refer to it as Pontryagin’s Minimum Principle (PMP) for
the rest of this paper) for necessary conditions for optimal
control in the presence of hard constraints on control. Using
methods derived by these four mathematicians, differential
games were formulated and solved in many works to be
described throughout this paper.
III. OVERVIEW OF RECENT RESULTS IN
PURSUIT-EVASION
At the center of Differential Games lies the fundamental
conflict of two parties known as “Pursuit-Evasion”. Pursuit-
evasion involves at least two agents or groups, labeled
Pursuers and Evaders. The goal of a pursuer is to capture
evading agents, while the converse is the goal of an evader,
to avoid being captured by a pursuer. This is a zero-sum game
where the cost/payoff is the time-to-capture. Basic questions
arise, “What path should an evader or pursuer take to achieve
their goal of avoiding or ensuring capture; and, under optimal
play, by either pursuer or evader, is capture at all possible?”
In this article, we begin by looking at this conflict and briefly
discuss the current literature available describing strategies,
methods, and applications. We invite the interested reader
to read the great historical and literature surveys of Isaacs’
work documented in [9], [12].
The idea of pursuit-evasion differential games is not
limited to physical entities chasing after one another; Isaacs
defined kinematic equations which described the surfaces
upon which states were constrained. Using these differential
equations, one could propose problems in other research
areas including but not limited to economics, sports, robotics,
and air-combat. In this article, the focus is on differential
games of pursuit-evasion, but it is important to note that the
applications of these mathematical tools are not limited to
these simple, toy problems, a syllogism for more complex
scenarios which may not be suitable for the public domain.
A. One Pursuer, One Evader (1v1)
The premise of a differential game starts with the conflict
between two players who share a common performance
functional; the goals of the pursuer and evader are counter
to one another. These are minimax problems, that is, zero-
sum-games, since an optimal solution for the performance
functional is one in which the strategy of one of the players
seeks to minimize the performance functional while the strat-
egy of the other player tries to maximize it. Constraints on
the player’s come in the form of dynamics. These constraints
can be linear or nonlinear. The classical problem of pursuit-
evasion can be seen in an early work by Ho, Bryson, and
Baron [13]. In their work, a two-player differential game
was formulated in a Linear-Quadratic form to capture the
basic pursuit-evasion conflict. Later, in the NASA technical
report [14], differential models were employed in order to
gauge the differences in performance between a manually
piloted vehicle and an optimally controlled one as provided
in the earlier work, [13]. The experiment showed that the use
of differential games indeed provided useful information to
pilots, but a cautionary statement at the end of the technical
report stated that, ”...differential game problems will, in
general, be more complicated theoretically than their optimal
control counterparts.” The NASA report concluded that the
idea of solving differential games was thought to be useful
as information provided to a pilot, but not yet accepted to
be a means of automatic control, a popular research topic
today.
In a dissertation by Satimov [15], the application of differ-
ential games was envisioned for use in various fields such as
economics and military operations. Satimov also stated that
in the case of a single-player, differential games amount to
optimal control problems, and that different modifications of
Isaacs’ method give the necessary and sufficient conditions
for optimality. The relationship between optimal control
and differential games is through the use of variational
techniques, [3], [16]. If all but one of the player’s control
laws are given, the differential game reverts to a one-sided
optimal control problem.
1) Homicidal Chauffeur Game: In his seminal text, Isaacs
proposed the famous “Homicidal Chauffeur” problem [3].
In this game, a hypothetical slow but highly maneuverable
holonomic pedestrian is pitted against a driver of a mo-
tor vehicle which is faster but less maneuverable (a.k.a.
a Dubin’s Car). In this somewhat macabre scenario, the
driver attempts to run over the pedestrian. The question
to be solved is: Under what circumstances, and with what
strategy, can the driver of the car guarantee that he can
always catch the pedestrian or conversely, the pedestrian
guarantee that he can indefinitely elude the car, [3]. And, if
the pedestrian’s demise is guaranteed, what is the chauffeur’s
optimal strategy that will minimize the time-to-capture of
the pedestrian, and what is the latter’s strategy to maximize
his time? This simple game is a classical 1-pursuer-1-evader
problem used to represent military applications for reasons
of acceptance and publication. Surveys have documented the
history and notable work related to the “Homicidal Chauffeur
Differential Game,” [9], [17]–[19], going into detail and
expanding about the various aspects of this problem.
A definitive work on the Homicidal Chauffeur Differen-
tial Game is Merz’s Ph.D. thesis, [20]. Merz investigated
the Homicidal Chauffeur Differential Game in great detail
describing two new singular lines known as: “switch enve-
lope” and “focal line.” These new lines further expand on
Isaacs’ “barrier”, “universal”, and “equivocal” singular lines.
His work gives great detail and insight into the problem.
Breakwell and Merz helped motivate the complete solution
of the Homicidal Chauffeur game at a conference in 1969,
[21]. Marchal also studied the Homicidal Chauffeur game
in great detail describing how using Pontryagin’s Minimum
Principle could assist the interpretation of complex solutions,
[17].
2) The Two Cars Differential Game: A variation of the
Homicidal Chauffeur Differential Game is the “Two Cars”
Differential Game where two players, each controlling a
car with minimum turning radius, are engaged in a pursuit-
evasion game. In early work, Meier investigated the problem
of Two Cars where both players had the same minimum
turn radius, the pursuer was slower than the evader, and
the capture was defined by coming inside the range, l, of
the Evader, [22]. Another analysis of the Two-Car problem
was performed by [23], [24]. In their papers, regions of
capture, escape, and barrier surfaces between those regions
were presented. Fig. 1 describes the geometry of the Two-Car
Problem. Radius R1 and R2 describe the minimum turning
radii of each player, u1 and u2 describe the curves associated
with a max rate turn, and w1 & w2 describe each player’s
velocity.
Fig. 1. The coordinate frames and turning radii used to describe the Two
Cars Problem [23] Radius R1 and R2 describe the minimum turning radii
of each player and u1 and u2 describe the curves associated with a max
rate turn. w1 and w2 describe each player’s velocity.
In [23] both agents have sector based regions of capture,
typical of an aerial dogfight; but, in [24], the regions of
capture were different, describing a heterogeneous model
of on-board weapon systems. Similarly, in [25], Greenfield
looked into the two-car problem, endowing the pursuer with
a surveillance capability of range, l. The objective, to escape
the surveillance region in minimum time. In an earlier work,
Lewin investigated a similar differential game called the
“Surveillance-Evasion” Differential Game [26]. In the game,
the evader strives to escape as soon as possible from the
pursuer’s detection circle, while the pursuer’s desire is the
opposite.
A complete analysis performed by Bera, Makkapati, and
Kothari goes into detail of both games of kind and degree
with studies on differing agent’s speeds, capture radius and
maneuverability constraints, [27]. In their work, they develop
the three-dimensional plots of the state space, highlighting
the barrier and switching surfaces for the different scenarios.
3) Pursuit-Evasion in Constrained Environments: In an
effort to consider differential games in a more realistic
way, the introduction of boundaries and constraints on states
allows for finite spaces and regions to be included in
the game formulation. By imposing limitations on physical
states, the pursuit-evasion differential game can be restricted
to a bounded area or obstacles may be applied. A two
player differential pursuit-evasion game where an obstacle is
added to delay the pursuer or to avoid capture entirely was
proposed by Fisac and Sastry [28]. Similarly, the reference
[29] considered pursuit-evasion games in the presence of
obstacles which inhibit the motion of the players. In their
work, the use of polygons, line-segments, and asymmetric
obstacles (an obstacle which effects one player differently
than another) are developed. Fuchs and Khargonekar moti-
vated the use of escort regions through manipulation of the
performance functional, [30]. In [31] the pursuer and evader
are constrained to road networks and, in [32], a one-sided
constrained is imposed where the pursuer is not restricted to
a road network while the evader is.
4) Pursuit-Evasion with Incomplete Information: In cases
where one or more agents do not have complete information
about the state of the game, these are problems called “Dif-
ferential Games of Incomplete Information.” In his seminal
work, [3] stated that the ability to pose problems which
restricted information to the individual players “...appears to
be the most vital area for future research.” Roxin and Tsokos,
introduced a stochastic approach as a means of modeling
partial information one agent might have relative to another,
[33]. Chernousko and Melikyan described a differential game
where incomplete information is provided to one of the
agents [34]. This idea was proposed in order to account for
information delay or gaps of information during game play.
Yavin proposed an incomplete information pursuit-evasion
differential game by restricting the pursuer’s information on
bearing and allowed the Evader to have perfect informa-
tion in the engagement, [35]. Giovannangeli, Heymann and
Rivlin tackled the problem of pursuit while avoiding convex
obstacles by using Apollonius circles to provide paths in-
which the pursuer’s visibility of the evader is guaranteed
throughout the engagement, [36]; the geometric concept of
Apollonius circle will be formally defined in Section IV-B.
In [37], Hexner considered the problem where a parameter is
unavailable to only one player at the beginning of the game,
and the other has a probability density function describing
that parameter was described. Pachter and Yavin investigated
the effects of noise on the Homicidal Chauffeur problem
by introducing stochasics to the pursuit-evasion differential
game dynamics, [38]. Battistini and Shima also employed
a stochastic model to overcome the limitations imposed by
bearing-only measurements made by a pursuer, [39].
The authors of [40] studied a differential game with non-
linear stochastic equation where two players are subjected
to noisy measurements. The paper [41] presented an N-
pursuer-1-evader differential where the evader can observe
all the pursuers but the pursuers have limited observations
of themselves and the evader. A pursuit-evasion game was
studied in [42] where a pursuer engages an evader using
Unattended Ground Sensors (UGSs) that detect the evader’s
passage in a road network; when the pursuer arrives at an
instrumented node, the UGSs inform the pursuer if and when
the evader visited the node.
5) Pursuit Evasion in Aerial Engagements: Applications
of pursuit-evasion differential games relating to tactical air-
to-air applications have been investigated. Shinar and Gut-
man developed a closed form solution to a 3-Dimensional
missile-aircraft pursuit-evasion game, [43]. Shinar also in-
vestigated a realistic pursuit-evasion engagement involving a
missile engaged on an aircraft and air-to-air scenarios using
variational methods, [44]. Considering naval applications,
Pachter and Milch framed their two-player engagement as a
Homicidal Chauffeur Differential Game where dynamics of
the ships are taken into account, [45]. Greenwood designed
a realistic differential game in 3-dimensions by modeling
fighter aircraft, [46]. Greenwood used dynamics of two
fighter aircraft in space and even considered firing envelopes
as part of this barrier analysis. In [47] a differential game
is proposed which involves a pursuit-evasion engagement
between a missile and an aircraft. In the game formulation,
a nonlinear miss-distance was used as a payoff functional.
In [48] a pursuit-evasion game where the dynamics of the
pursuer can be changed during the pursuit a finite number of
times was investigated. In [49], the evader has the ability to
change their dynamics during the engagement a finite number
of times. Merz investigated the problem of pursuit or evasion
selection if both agents were endowed with capture sets and
prior assignment had not been implemented, [50]. Related
to dog-fights and aerial combat, Merz’s concern was with
role assignment in pursuit-evasion differential games and of
course the outcome. In more recent work [51], [52] the target
area defense differential game has been investigated and it
will be described in more detail in Section V.
6) Other 1V1 Works: Another example of posing the
pursuit-evasion problems using simple motion kinematics
in a differential game is in a work by Leitmann, [53]. In
this paper, a simple differential game between a pursuer
and evader was proposed, and variational techniques were
applied to determine outcomes of the game where terminal
miss distance was used as the payoff/cost functional.
In [54], Calise and Yu use simple motion kinematics
as well as expanded control energy to formulate a game
involving the pursuit-evasion of two aircraft at medium to
long range. Using a reduced-order model with control energy,
Calise and Yu are able to find trajectories similar to minimum
time intercept using only four states to model the encounter.
The “Lion and the Man” differental game discussed by
Quincampoix is a pursuit-evasion differential game where
the lion pursues a man, [55]. The lion and the man are free to
change their velocity direction instantaneously but are limited
to the intensity with which they do so. Since the lion is faster
than the man, the regions of escape and capture are of interest
and are numericaly determined.
B. N Pursuers, 1 Evader (Nv1)
The two-pursuer-1-evader problem had been well docu-
mented, [56]–[61]. Hagedorn and Breakwell investigated two
pursuers engaging one evader which was required to pass
between the two pursuers, [56]. The game of degree was
addressed in [57], [58] by employing the following payoff
functional: the distance between the object being pursued
and the pursuer closest to it, when a fixed-time engagement
terminates. The paper [59] considered the three-player game
in detail by briefly discussing the surfaces of the differential
game when pursuers were both stronger, both weaker, and
one stronger-one-weaker than the evader. The authors of
[60] studied the case where faster pursuers cooperate to
capture a slower evader in minimum time. Hayoun and
Shima restrict the pursuer’s controls to be bounded and their
intercept times equal, [61]. Using two “strong” pursuers,
closed-form optimal controls are derived, and it is shown that
the addition of a second pursuer introduces a new singular
zone to the game space in which the pursuers can guarantee
equal misses, regardless of the evaders actions.
In the more general case, where there are N-pursuers
and 1-evader, challenges with task allocation and strategy
become more apparent. In order to aid the task allocation
between the N-pursuers, Huang and Bakolas employ the
Voronoi diagram construct. It is used when capture of an
evader within a bounded domain is considered, [62], [63].
In [64] sufficient conditions are presented for the existence
of an evasion strategy where simple motion kinemtics for
the players is considered. The paper [65] considered a more
general case of N-pursuers engaged against one evader.
Huang et al. employed a decentralized control scheme based
on the Voronoi partition of the game domain, where the
pursuers jointly shrink/minimize the area of the evader’s
Voronoi cell, [62]. Fig. 2 is a visualization of the individual
pursuer cells from [63].
Fig. 2. A Voronoi Diagram [63] describing the task allocation in an N-
pursuer, 1-evader problem. Each color describes a cell from which a pursuer
would capture an evader if starting in that cell. © 2010 IEEE
The N-pursuer-1-evader problem was investigated in [66]
by focusing on guaranteed escape of the evader. The refer-
ence [67] considered identical non-holonomic players where
a computationally efficient algorithm to obtain approximate
solutions is proposed. Solutions to a multi pursuer single-
superior-evader pursuit-evasion differential game using fuzzy
logic methods were developed in [68], [69], where the
formation control mechanism guarantees that the pursuers
are distributed around the superior evader in order to avoid
collision between pursuers and guarantees that the capture
regions of each two adjacent pursuers are such that the
capture of the fast evader is guaranteed. VonMoll et. al. also
have considered multiple pursuers engaged on a single evader
[70]–[72]. By utilizing the Apollonius circles, they exploit
the benefits of cooperation amongst the pursuers in order to
reduce the capture time of the evader.
C. 1 Pursuer, M Evaders (1vM)
The single pursuer against M-evaders differential game
is a game where a pursuer tries to capture M-evaders in
finite time. One challenge is to select the order in which the
pursuer accomplishes his task in minimum time. In, these
problems the pursuer is faster, more maneuverable, or has
other advantages over the evaders.
The case which involves two evaders and one pursuer has
received much attention, [73]–[76]. In [73] the case where a
single pursuer engages two evaders was addressed. The goal
of this work was to investigate a differential game where the
pursuer tries to capture either of the evaders, minimizing
its cost, and the evaders strive to escape the pursuer for
as long as possible, increasing the payoff/functional of the
pursuer. Scott and Leonard investigated a scenario where
two evaders employ coordinated strategies to evade a single
pursuer, but also to keep them close to each other, [74]. In
[75], Breakwell and Hagedorn investigated the capture of
two evaders in succession by one pursuer in minimum time.
Pachter and Yavin proposed a differential game of pursuit-
evasion with one pursuer and two evaders, the motion of the
players being affected by noise, [76]. The stochastic game of
degree is considered, where the pursuer strives to maximize
the probability of his winning the game, i.e., of capturing
at least one of the evaders. A 3-Dimensional pursuit-evasion
differential game consisting of a pursuer engaged against a
team consisting of two evaders was proposed in [77]. The
team of evaders consisted of a true evader and false decoy
evader; the evaders coordinate their actions to ensure the true
evader escapes without capture.
In a more general case of one pursuer engaged against
many evaders, the pursuer aims at capturing all evaders,
while the evaders coordinate their escape. Liu and Zhou in-
vestigated a game involving a single-pursuer-multiple-evader
pursuit-evasion game where a superior pursuer attempts to
minimize the total capture time of all the evaders, [78].
Fig. 3 shows the capture of M-evaders in succession from
[78]. In [79] the study of capture time for many pursuers
against one or more evaders is investigated. The authors of
[80] formulate and solve a pursuit-evasion game in which
a single faster player chases several homogenous evaders; a
Fig. 3. Example of 1-pursuer-2-evader engagement and 1-pursuer-5-evader
engagement found in [78]. Since the pursuer is much more capable than the
evaders capture of all agents is guaranteed. © 2013 IEEE
task allocation method to simulate the optimal engagements
for “fixed sequence capture” and “free sequence capture” of
the pursuer is applied in that reference.
D. N Pursuers, M Evaders (NvM)
The most general case of N-pursuers and M-evaders allows
for more complex engagements to be analyzed. Katz et. al
investigated a zero-sum differential game formulation for
the control of military air operations using the method of
characteristics, [81]. Although their examples were shown for
1-Pursuer 1-Evader, their work has extensions to N-pursuer
n-Evader problems. Rusnak proposed a dynamic game called
“The Lady and the Body-Guards versus the Bandits”, [82].
The Bandits’ team objective is to capture the Lady while the
Lady and her Body-Guards objective is to prevent it. The
Body-Guards are trying to intercept the Bandits prior to their
arrival to the proximity of the Lady. The formulation and
solution of the game is presented. As described in Section
V, this problem is a similar problem, but with more players
involved. A creative approach to handing the task allocation
of many agents was proposed by Bakolas and Tsiotras by
employing the Voronoi diagram construct, [63]. Using the
Voronoi diagram, such that a pursuer residing inside a given
set of the partition can intercept a moving target faster than
any other pursuer outside the set. Another means of task
allocation was proposed in [83] where Awheda and Schwartz
proposed a fuzzy logic based decentralized control scheme
using the Apollonius circles construct. A formal analysis
of both optimal guidance and optimal assignments of N
pursuers to M evaders, for N ≥M , was undertaken in [84].
Finally, the papers [85]–[87] address multiplayer differential
games based on numerical solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi-
Isaacs (HJI) equations.
IV. TWO CUTTERS AND FUGITIVE SHIP DIFFERENTIAL
GAME
This section provides a detailed treatment of Isaacs’ clas-
sical problem of two cutters and fugitive ship differential
game where two faster pursuers cooperate to capture a
slower evader in minimum time. The evader, knowing that
is being pursued by two cooperative and fast pursuers,
tries to maximize the capture time. Isaacs proposed the
players’ optimal strategies in [3] and these strategies were
verified in [60] where the Value function was obtained and
it was shown to be continuous, continuously differentiable,
or C1, and the solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI)
Partial Differential Equation (PDE). This section extends
the presentation in [60] by offering a complete proof of
the verification theorem pertaining to the two cutters and
fugitive ship differential game, it also identifies the game’s
singular surface which is of dispersal type, and it illustrates
the applicability of the solution of this differential game to
address interesting and more complex pursuit-evasion games
with multiple pursuers and multiple evaders.
One of the fundamental concepts in differential games is
the HJI PDE which provides a sufficient condition for the
existence of a Nash equilibrium. Regardless of how the Value
function is obtained, the HJI equation can be used to verify
that such function indeed meets the optimality conditions.
Moreover, since the gradient of the Value function takes the
place of the co-states in the PMP, a direct solution of the
HJI PDE can be used to synthesize the optimal strategies. In
this section we use the former objective, that is, verification.
In the following, we summarize the sufficient conditions for
a Nash equilibrium.
Consider the following dynamics
x˙ = f(t, x(t), u(t), v(t)) (1)
for t ∈ [0, tf ] and x(0) = x0. The input variables u(t)
and v(t) are the controls of each team, which are required
to belong to an appropriate subspace. The performance
functional is
J = q(x(tf )) +
∫ tf
0
g(t, x(t), u(t), v(t))dt (2)
State feedback policies are considered, that is, u(t) =
µ(t, x(t)) and v(t) = ν(t, x(t)), for t ∈ [0, tf ].
Theorem 1: [88]. Assume that there exists a C1 function
V (t, x(t)) that satisfies the HJI PDE
−∂V∂t = ∂V∂x · f(t, x, u∗, v∗) + g(t, x, u∗, v∗) (3)
with V (tf , x) = q(x). Then, the pair of strategies u∗ =
µ∗(t, x(t)) and v∗ = ν∗(t, x(t)) is a saddle-point equilibrium
in state feedback policies.
This result will be used to verify the solution of the two
cutters and fugitive ship differential game in Section IV-C
but first we provide a formulation of the problem.
A. Problem Formulation
Consider one Evader E and two Pursuers P1 and P2 with
simple motion dynamics and constant speeds vE , vP1, and
vP2, respectively; the players are holonomic. It is assumed
that the pursuers are faster than the evader. Through explicit
cooperation, the Pursuers aim at intercepting the Evader
in minimum time, while the Evader tries to maximize the
capture time. The advantage of having two cooperative
Pursuers is that, depending on the initial positions of the
players, the cooperative capture time is less than the capture
time without cooperation. This problem has important reper-
cussions; although one pursuer is guaranteed to capture a
slower Evader in an open plane, there exist situations where
the Evader may win the game by reaching a certain subset
of the space or exiting the domain of the game. For instance,
consider an evading ship fleeing a pursuer and trying to exit
the influence zone of the later. In this case the Pursuer would
benefit from a second Pursuer and cooperation that strive
to minimize the capture time preventing the Evader from
reaching a safe haven.
The controls of E, P1, and P2 are their respective in-
stantaneous headings φ, ψ1, and ψ2. The states of E, P1,
and P2 are defined by their Cartesian coordinates in the
realistic plane xE = (xE , yE), xP1 = (xP1, yP1), and
xP2 = (xP2, yP2), respectively. The complete state of the
game is defined by x := (xE , yE , xP1, yP1, xP2, yP2) ∈ R6.
The Evader’s control variable is his instantaneous heading
angle, uE = {φ}. P1 and P2 affect the state of the game
by choosing the instantaneous respective headings, ψ1 and
ψ2, so the Pursuers’ control variable is uP = {ψ1, ψ2}. The
normalized dynamics in the realistic plane x˙ = f(x,uP ,uE)
are specified by the system of ordinary differential equations
x˙E = cosφ, y˙E = sinφ
x˙P1 = β1 cosψ1, y˙P1 = β1 sinψ1
x˙P2 = β2 cosψ2, y˙P2 = β2 sinψ2
(4)
where β1 = vP1vE > 1 and β2 =
vP2
vE
> 1 are
the normalized speeds of the two Pursuers and they
are not necessarily equal. The initial state is x0 :=
(xE0 , yE0 , xP10 , yP10 , xP20 , yP20) = x(t0). We confine our
attention to point capture, so the game terminates at time tf
when the state of the system satisfies the terminal condition
a) xP1 = xE , yP1 = yE , or
b) xP2 = xE , yP2 = yE , or
c) both a) and b) apply.
(5)
The terminal time tf is defined as the time instant
when the state of the system satisfies any one of
the conditions in (5), the terminal state being xf :=
(xEf , yEf , xP1f , yP1f , xP2f , yP2f ) = x(tf ). The Evader
strives to maximize the capture time while the Pursuers
cooperate to minimize the capture time, so the performance
functional is
min
ψ1,ψ2
max
φ
∫ tf
0
dt (6)
subject to (4)-(5).
B. Solution
In this section we follow the procedure to derive regular
solutions of differential games [89], [90]. We introduce the
co-states λ := (λxE , λyE , λxP1 , λyP1 , λxP2 , λyP2) ∈ R6 and
the Hamiltonian of the differential game is formulated as
follows
H = 1 + λxE cosφ+ λyE sinφ
+ β1λxP1 cosψ1 + β1λyP1 sinψ1
+ β2λxP2 cosψ2 + β2λyP2 sinψ2.
(7)
The optimal control inputs (in terms of the co-state variables)
are obtained from
min
ψi,ψ2
max
φ
H ≡ 0 (8)
and they are given by
cosφ∗ = λxE√
λ2xE
+λ2yE
, sinφ∗ = λyE√
λ2xE
+λ2yE
(9)
cosψ∗1 = −
λxP1√
λ2xP1
+λ2yP1
, sinψ∗1 = −
λyP1√
λ2xP1
+λ2yP1
(10)
cosψ∗2 = −
λxP2√
λ2xP2
+λ2yP2
, sinψ∗2 = −
λyP2√
λ2xP2
+λ2yP2
.
(11)
Additionally, we can determine the co-state dynamics by
calculating λ˙ = −∂H∂x . Hence, the co-state dynamics are:
λ˙xE = λ˙yE = λ˙xP1 = λ˙yP1 = λ˙xP2 = λ˙yP1 = 0; then,
all co-states are constant and the optimal control inputs (9)-
(11) are constant as well. Because the optimal headings are
constant then the players’ optimal trajectories are straight
lines. Also, since the terminal condition is point capture (5)
we have the following: For case a) in (5):
xP1f =xP10+β1tf1cosψ
∗
1 =xE0+tf1 cosφ
∗=xEf
yP1f =yP10+β1tf1 sinψ
∗
1 = yE0+tf1 sinφ
∗=yEf
(12)
where tf1 ≥ 0 can be written in terms of φ∗ as follows
tf1 = c1 cos(φ
∗ − λ1) +
√
c21 cos
2(φ∗ − λ1) + c1r10 (13)
where
λ1 = arctan
( yE0 − yP10
xE0 − xP10
)
r10 =
√
(xE0 − xP10)2 + (yE0 − yP10)2
c1 =
1
β21 − 1
r10 .
For case b) in (5) we have:
xP20 + β2tf2 cosψ
∗
2 = xE0 + tf2 cosφ
∗
yP20 + β2tf2 sinψ
∗
2 = yE0 + tf2 sinφ
∗ (14)
where tf2 ≥ 0 can be written in terms of φ∗ as follows
tf2 = c2 cos(φ
∗ − λ2) +
√
c22 cos
2(φ∗ − λ2) + c2r20 (15)
where
λ2 = arctan
( yE0 − yP20
xE0 − xP20
)
r20 =
√
(xE0 − xP20)2 + (yE0 − yP20)2
c2 =
1
β22 − 1
r20 .
Finally, for the most interesting case c) in (5), both (12) and
(14) are simultaneously satisfied for the same heading φ∗.
Because β1 > 1 (respectively β2 > 1) there exists
a (unique) solution ψ1 (respectively ψ2) to equation (12)
(respectively (14)) for any φ ∈ [0, 2pi]. However, the opposite
is not true. There exists a range of heading values for ψ1
(respectively ψ2) such that no solution φ exists (these Pursuer
headings correspond to the cases where the Pursuer runs
away from the Evader). Note that tf1 = 0 (respectively
tf2 = 0) only if r1 = 0 (respectively, r2 = 0), where
ri =
√
(xE − xPi)2 + (yE − yPi)2, for i = 1, 2. In such a
case the Evader has been captured and the Game has ended.
Let us assume that condition a) in (5) is active, whereupon
the optimal Evader strategy is obtained by solving
maxφ tf1
subject to eq. (12) (16)
which can be computed by solving for φ in
dtf1
dφ = −c1 sin(φ− λ1)
− c21 cos(φ∗−λ1) sin(φ∗−λ1)√
c21 cos
2(φ∗−λ1)+c1r10
= 0
⇒ sin(φ− λ1) = 0 ⇒ φ∗ = λ1
(17)
as expected (the heading φ = λ1 + pi will minimize tf1 and
since E chooses its heading φ then it would choose the one
that maximizes tf1 ).
Similarly, if condition b) in (5) is active, then the optimal
Evader strategy is φ∗ = λ2, as expected. In cases a) or b) the
solution of the Two-Pursuer One-Evader Differential Game
(2P1EDG) simplifies to the solution of the differential game
with one pursuer and one Evader where the Evader runs
directly away from the pursuer.
Since it is not evident at the beginning which condition, a),
b), or c), is active, then the individual conditions a) and b) are
checked first as follows: Consider φ = λ1 and obtain tf1(λ1)
using (13). Then, substitute φ = λ1 in (15) to compute
tf2(λ1) and compare:
if tf1(λ1) ≤ tf2(λ1) (18)
then φ∗ = λ1 and there is nothing Pursuer 2 can do to
decrease the capture time tf1(φ
∗ = λ1).
Also, consider φ = λ2 and obtain tf2(λ2) using (15).
Then, substitute φ = λ2 in (13) to compute tf1(λ2) and
compare:
if tf2(λ2) ≤ tf1(λ2) (19)
then φ∗ = λ2 and there is nothing Pursuer 1 can do to
decrease the capture time tf2(φ
∗ = λ2).
If neither, condition (18) nor condition (19), is satisfied, we
check if the interesting condition c) is active. In such a case
of simultaneous capture of E by P1 and P2, both equations
(12) and (14) need to hold for the same φ∗ and for the same
tf = tf1 = tf2 , where tf1 and tf2 are given by (13) and
(15), respectively. Additionally, for initial conditions such
that c) is active, the capture time will be reduced compared
to the individual cases where the game only involves E and
P1 or only E and P2. Hence, the complete solution of the
2P1EDG should define the optimal saddle point strategies of
every player and the outcome of the game in terms of which
pursuer will actually capture the Evader.
In case c) in (5) the triple (φ, ψ1, ψ2) which simultane-
ously satisfies (12)-(15) with tf1 = tf2 can be obtained from
the intersection of two Apollonius circles. The first circle
is based on r10 and the speed ratio β1. The second circle
is based on r20 and the speed ratio β2. The center of the
Apollonius circle between E and Pi, for i = 1, 2, is at a
distance ci = 1β2i−1ri0 from E and its radius is ρi =
βi
β2i−1ri0 .
The coordinates of the circle center are
ai = xE + ρi cosλi, bi = yE + ρi sinλi
and the equation of the circle is
(x− ai)2 + (y − bi)2 = ρ2i (20)
for i = 1, 2. From the two points of intersection of the
circles, the Evader chooses the point that maximizes the
capture time, as expected; this point is the intersection
point of the Apollonius circles (20) which is the farthest
away from the Evader’s position (xE , yE). Let I : (xI , yI)
be the aimpoint and we have that φ∗s = arctan(
yI−yE
xI−xE ),
ψ∗1s = arctan(
yI−yP1
xI−xP1 ), and ψ
∗
2s = arctan(
yI−yP2
xI−xP2 ) which
guarantee simultaneous interception by both Pursuers. In the
case of simultaneous capture we have that λm ≤ φ∗s ≤ λM ,
where λm = min {λ1, λ2} and λM = max {λ1, λ2}.
In this section we described a method that provides a
simple way to design a state feedback pursuit strategy for
the 2P1EDG and it is summarized as follows.
Proposition 1: Consider the Two-Pursuer One-Evader
Differential Game (4)-(6) where β1 > 1 and β2 > 1. The
solution of the differential game is:
φ∗ = λ1, ψ∗1 = λ1 if tf1(λ1) ≤ tf2(λ1)
φ∗ = λ2, ψ∗2 = λ2 if tf2(λ2) ≤ tf1(λ2)
φ∗ = φ∗s, ψ
∗
1 = ψ
∗
1s, ψ
∗
2 = ψ
∗
2s otherwise
(21)
C. Verification
In this section we obtain the Value function and it is ver-
ified that the Value function is continuous and continuously
differentiable and that it also satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Isaacs (HJI) Partial Differential Equation (PDE).
Based on the different outcomes of the Differential Game,
the capture set, namely, the whole state space, is partitioned
into three subsets. These three subsets are:
- R1: where E is only captured by P1.
- R2: where E is only captured by P2.
- Rs: where E is simultaneously captured by P1 and P2.
In addition, for given speed ratio parameters β1 and β2
the subsets can be characterized using the conditions in (18)
and (19). The subset of states that result in (18) (respectively,
(19)) holding with equality represent the boundary between
regions R1 and Rs (respectively, regions R2 and Rs). An
example of these regions is shown in Fig. 4. Provided that
every agent plays optimally, Fig. 4 represents the property
that if E is initially located inside R1, then the outcome of
the game is that E is captured only by P1. If E is in R2, it
is captured only by P2 and if E is in Rs, then it is captured
simultaneously by both Pursuers.
We wish to obtain a state feedback solution. At any time
t, 0 < t < tf the state is x(t) = [xE(t), yE(t), xP1(t),
yP1(t), xP2(t), yP2(t)]
T . The Value function is given by
V (x) =

√
(xE−xP1)2+(yE−yP1)2
β1−1 ∀ x ∈ R1√
(xE−xP2)2+(yE−yP2)2
β2−1 ∀ x ∈ R2
F1(x)tf2 (x)−F2(x)tf1 (x)
F1(x)−F2(x) ∀ x ∈ Rs
(22)
Fig. 4. Regions R1, R2, and Rs. The initial position of the Pursuers are
P1 : (0, 3) and P2 : (0,−3) and the speed ratio parameters are β1 = 1.3
and β2 = 1.25.
where
tfi(x)= 1β2
i
−1
[
(xE−xPi) cosφ∗+(yE−yPi) sinφ∗
+
(
[(xE−xPi) cosφ∗ + (yE−yPi) sinφ∗]2
+(β2i −1)[(xE−xPi)2+(yE−yPi)2]
)1/2] (23)
Fi(x)=
[
(yE − yPi) cosφ∗ − (xE − xPi) sinφ∗
]
×([(xE−xPi) cosφ∗ + (yE − yPi) sinφ∗]2
+(β2i −1)[(xE−xPi)2+(yE−yPi)2]
)−1/2 (24)
and βi > 1, for i = 1, 2, where φ∗(x, β1, β2) is obtained
from the points of intersection of the two Apollonius circles.
The optimal Evader heading φ∗ is only a function of the state
x (the positions of the three players) and of the speed ratio
parameters β1 and β2. Due to the complexity of an explicit
expression of φ∗, the terms cosφ∗ and sinφ∗ remain in V (x).
The physical meaning of the Value function is the capture
time under optimal play. The Value function takes different
forms depending on which region the Evader is located; in
any case, it should be a function of the state of the system.
In region R1, it is only a function of the states of E and P1.
In region R2, it is only a function of the states of E and P2.
Finally, in region Rs, V has to be correctly written in terms
of the states of E, P1, and P2.
The last form of V (x) in (22), where x ∈ Rs, is a convex
combination of the Value of the game, the capture time, using
the states of both Pursuers. When x ∈ Rs the condition for
simultaneous capture is that tf1(φ
∗) = tf2(φ
∗). In such a
case, we define tf (φ∗) ≡ tf1(φ∗) = tf2(φ∗).
Dispersal surface. A dispersal surface D ∈ Rs exists if the
two intersections of the Apollonius circles are located at the
same distance from the Evader’s position; hence, two optimal
strategies exist. This dispersal surface will be illustrated in
Section IV-D. Let us define R−s = Rs − D and define the
subset of the state space where regular solutions apply R =
R1 ∪R2 ∪R−s .
Theorem 2: Consider the Two-Pursuer One-Evader Dif-
ferential Game (4)-(6). The solution of the differential game
is given by Proposition 1. The corresponding Value function
is given by (22). Then, the Value function (22) is continuous
and continuously differentiable over R and it satisfies the
HJI equation for any x ∈ R.
Proof. We start by analyzing the gradient of V (x) in regions
R1 and R2. In the case where x ∈ R1 we can write
∂V
∂xE
= 1β1−1 cosλ1,
∂V
∂yE
= 1β1−1 sinλ1
∂V
∂xP1
= − ∂V∂xE , ∂V∂yP1 = − ∂V∂yE
(25)
where
cosλ1 =
xE−xP1√
(xE−xP1)2+(yE−yP1)2
sinλ1 =
yE−yP1√
(xE−xP1)2+(yE−yP1)2
.
Therefore, the Value function V (x) is C1 inside region R1.
Similar expressions to (25) can be obtained when x ∈ R2 to
show that V (x) is C1 inside region R2.
Now, the partial derivative of the Value function with
respect to each element of the state x when x ∈ Rs is
∂V
∂x =
−F2
F1−F2
∂tf1
∂x +
F1
F1−F2
∂tf2
∂x
+ tf1
∂
∂x
(
−F2
F1−F2
)
+ tf2
∂
∂x
(
F1
F1−F2
)
+ ∂V∂φ∗ · dφ
∗
dx
(26)
where tfi = tfi(x) and Fi = Fi(x) are given by (23)
and (24), respectively, for i = 1, 2. The functions tfi , Fi,
φ∗, and V depend only on the state x. The notation (x) is
dropped hereafter in order to simplify the notation in (26)
and in the remaining equations of this proof. In eq. (26)
the variable x denotes each element of the state x, that is,
x = {xE , yE , xP1 , yP1 , xP2 , yP2}. The specific forms of ∂tfi∂x
are given by
∂tfi
∂xE
= 1
β2i−1
[
cosφ∗ + 1Qi
(
[(xE − xPi) cosφ∗
+ (yE − yPi) sinφ∗] cosφ∗
+ (β2i − 1)(xE − xPi)
)]
∂tfi
∂yE
= 1
β2i−1
[
sinφ∗ + 1Qi
(
[(xE − xPi) cosφ∗
+ (yE − yPi) sinφ∗] sinφ∗
+ (β2i − 1)(yE − yPi)
)]
∂tfi
∂xPj
=
{
− ∂tfi∂xE if i = j
0 otherwise
∂tfi
∂yPj
=
{
−∂tfi∂yE if i = j
0 otherwise
(27)
for i, j = 1, 2 where Qi =
(
[(xE − xPi) cosφ∗ + (yE −
yPi) sinφ
∗]2 + (β2i − 1)[(xE − xPi)2 + (yE − yPi)2]
)1/2
.
Note that Qi > 0.
Let us first analyze the terms in the second line of eq.
(26). Since tf = tf1 = tf2 we have that
tf1
∂
∂x
(
−F2
F1−F2
)
+ tf2
∂
∂x
(
F1
F1−F2
)
= tf
∂
∂x
(
F1−F2
F1−F2
)
= tf · 0
= 0.
We now evaluate the term ∂V∂φ∗ as follows
∂V
∂φ∗ =
−F2
F1−F2
∂tf1
∂φ∗ +
F1
F1−F2
∂tf2
∂φ∗
+ tf1
∂
∂φ∗
( −F2
F1−F2
)
+ tf2
∂
∂φ∗
(
F1
F1−F2
)
= −F2F1−F2
∂tf1
∂φ∗ +
F1
F1−F2
∂tf2
∂φ∗
+ tf
∂
∂φ∗
(
F1−F2
F1−F2
)
= −F2F1−F2
∂tf1
∂φ∗ +
F1
F1−F2
∂tf2
∂φ∗
where ∂tfi∂φ∗ = Fi · tfi . Therefore,
∂V
∂φ∗ =
−F1F2
F1−F2 tf1 +
F1F2
F1−F2 tf2 =
F1F2−F1F2
F1−F2 tf = 0
since tf = tf1 = tf2 . Hence the gradient of the Value
function (26) can be simplified and be written as
∂V
∂x =
−F2
F1−F2
∂tf1
∂x +
F1
F1−F2
∂tf2
∂x
(28)
for x = {xE , yE , xP1 , yP1 , xP2 , yP2}. Note that Fi(x) can be
written in the following form
Fi(x) =
(yE−yPi ) cosφ∗−(xE−xPi ) sinφ∗
Qi
= sin(λi−φ
∗)√
cos2(λi−φ∗)+β2i−1
(29)
for i = 1, 2. Since λm ≤ φ∗ ≤ λM , we have that F1 and F2
have different sign and F1−F2 6= 0. From (27) and (29) we
conclude that the Value function is C1 inside region Rs.
It is now critical to show that the Value function is C1 on
the boundary of each subset. We consider only the boundary
between R1 and Rs since the proof for the boundary be-
tween R2 and Rs follows in the same way. On the boundary
between R1 and Rs we have that φ∗ = λ1 because of (17).
We also have from (29) that F1(φ∗ = λ1) = 0. Thus, the
Value function evaluated in region Rs is given by
V (x) = −F2−F2 tf1 = tf1 .
Then, it is sufficient to show that tf1 as given in Rs which
is denoted by tf1s in (30) below, is equal to tf1 as given in
R1 (the subscript s is attached to tf1 to show where tf1 is
evaluated in Rs). Consider (23) evaluated at φ∗ = λ1
tf1s =
1
β21−1
[
(xE − xP1) cosλ1 + (yE − yP1) sinλ1
+
(
[(xE − xP1) cosλ1 + (yE − yP1) sinλ1]2
+ (β21 − 1)[(xE − xP1)2 + (yE − yP1)2]
)1/2 ]
= 1
β21−1
[√
(xE − xP1)2 + (yE − yP1)2
+
(
(xE − xP1)2 + (yE − yP1)2
+ (β21 − 1)[(xE − xP1)2 + (yE − yP1)2]
)1/2 ]
=
(β1+1)
√
(xE−xP1)2+(yE−yP1)2
β21−1
=
√
(xE−xP1)2+(yE−yP1)2
β1−1
= tf1 .
(30)
Thus, the Value function is continuous on the boundary
between regions R1 and Rs.
Let us now consider ∂V∂x on the same boundary. We want to
show that (28) is equal to (25) on the boundary between these
two subsets, where the optimal Evader strategy is φ∗ = λ1,
and for the relevant states x = {xE , yE , xP1, yP1}. Note that
∂V
∂xP2
= ∂V∂yP2 = 0 since F1 = 0 and
∂tf1
∂xP2
=
∂tf1
∂yP2
= 0. Let
us consider first ∂V∂xE in (28) evaluated at φ
∗ = λ1
∂V
∂xE
= −F2−F2
∂tf1
∂xE
= 1
β21−1
[
cosλ1
+
√
(xE−xP1)2+(yE−yP1)2 cosλ1+(β21−1)(xE−xP )
β1
√
(xE−xP1)2+(yE−yP1)2
]
= 1
β21−1
[
cosλ1 +
cosλ1+(β
2
1−1) cosλ1
β1
]
= β1+1
β21−1 cosλ1
= 1β1−1 cosλ1
(31)
which is equivalent to ∂V∂xE as given by (25). Following a
similar approach we obtain that ∂V∂yE ,
∂V
∂xP1
, and ∂V∂yP1 are
also continuous on the boundary between regions R1 and
Rs. Hence the Value function is C1 on the boundary between
regions R1 and Rs.
The same steps can be followed to show that the Value
function is C1 also on the boundary between regions R2
and Rs. Therefore, altogether, the Value function is C1 for
x ∈ R.
Finally, we show that the Value function satisfies the HJI
equation
∂V (x, t)
∂t
= arg min
uP
max
uE
{
∂V (x, t)
∂x
f(x,uP ,uE ) + 1
}
with uP = [ψ1, ψ2] and uE = φ. In this expression, the
term 1 follows from the cost
∫ tf
0
1dt. Then, for the optimal
feedback strategy, we have ∂V (x,t)∂t = 0 and V (x, t) = V (x);
therefore,
0 = arg min
uP
max
uE
{
∂V (x)
∂x
f(x,uP ,uE ) + 1
}
. (32)
If u∗P = u
∗
P (x) and u
∗
E = u
∗
E(x) are (feedback) optimal
solutions, then we can check if V is the value function by
checking
0 =
{
∂V (x)
∂x
f(x,u∗P ,u
∗
E ) + 1
}
. (33)
In Region 1 we have the following: φ∗ = ψ∗1 = λ1 and
∂V
∂x · f(x,u∗P ,u∗E)
= ∂V∂xE cosφ
∗ + ∂V∂yE sinφ
∗
+ β1
∂V
∂xP1
cosψ∗1 + β1
∂V
∂yP1
sinψ∗1
= 1
(β1−1)
√
(xE−xP1)2+(yE−yP1)2
[
(xE − xP1) cosλ1
+ (yE − yP1) sinλ1 − β1(xE − xP1) cosλ1
− β1(yE − yP1) sinλ1
]
= 1−β1
(β1−1)
√
(xE−xP1)2+(yE−yP1)2
[
(xE − xP1) cosλ1
+ (yE − yP1) sinλ1
]
= −1√
(xE−xP1)2+(yE−yP1)2
[
(xE−xP1)2+(yE−yP1)2√
(xE−xP1)2+(yE−yP1)2
]
= −1.
(34)
Therefore, we have that
1 + ∂V∂x · f(x,u∗P ,u∗E) = 1− 1 = 0 (35)
that is, the HJI equation is satisfied by the candidate Value
function in Region R1. The same equation follows in R2.
It is only left to show that the HJI equation is satisfied in
Region Rs. To accomplish this we use (27) and (28) to write
∂V
∂x · f(x,u∗P ,u∗E)
= ∂V∂xE cosφ
∗ + ∂V∂yE sinφ
∗
+ β1
∂V
∂xP1
cosψ∗1 + β1
∂V
∂yP1
sinψ∗1
+ β2
∂V
∂xP2
cosψ∗2 + β2
∂V
∂yP2
sinψ∗2
=
(
−F2
F1−F2
∂tf1
∂xE
+ F1F1−F2
∂tf2
∂xE
)
cosφ∗
+
(
−F2
F1−F2
∂tf1
∂yE
+ F1F1−F2
∂tf2
∂yE
)
sinφ∗
+ −F2F1−F2
(
∂tf1
∂xP1
β1 cosψ
∗
1 +
∂tf1
∂yP1
β1 sinψ
∗
1
)
+ F1F1−F2
(
∂tf2
∂xP2
β2 cosψ
∗
2 +
∂tf2
∂yP2
β2 sinψ
∗
2
)
(36)
subject to
cosψ∗i =
cosφ∗
βi
+
xE−xPi
βitf
sinψ∗i =
sinφ∗
βi
+
yE−yPi
βitf
(37)
for i = 1, 2. Note that (37) are the optimal Pursuers’
headings written in terms of the Evader’s optimal heading
φ∗, where the Evader aims at the intersection point of the
two Apollonius circles. In other words, (37) are obtained
from eqs. (12) and (14).
Substituting (37) into (36) we obtain
∂V
∂x · f(x,u∗P ,u∗E)
= 1tf · −F2F1−F2
(
∂tf1
∂xE
(xP1−xE) + ∂tf1∂yE (yP1−yE)
)
+ 1tf · F1F1−F2
(
∂tf2
∂xE
(xP2−xE) + ∂tf2∂yE (yP2−yE)
) (38)
and we also evaluate the terms
1
tf
(
∂tfi
∂xE
(xPi − xE) + ∂tfi∂yE (yPi − yE)
)
= − 1
tf (β2i−1)
[
(xE − xPi) cosφ∗ + (yE − yPi) sinφ∗
+ 1Qi
(
[(xE − xPi)2 cos2 φ∗
+ 2(xE − xPi)(yE − yPi) sinφ∗ cosφ∗
+ (yE − yPi)2 sin2 φ∗
+ (β2i − 1)[(xE − xPi)2 + (yE − yPi)2]
)]
= − 1
tf (β2i−1)
[
(xE − xPi) cosφ∗ + (yE − yPi) sinφ∗
+ 1Qi
(
[(xE − xPi) cosφ∗ + (yE − yPi) sinφ∗]2
+ (β2i − 1)[(xE − xPi)2 + (yE − yPi)2]
)]
= − 1
tf (β2i−1)
[
(xE − xPi) cosφ∗ + (yE − yPi) sinφ∗
+Qi
]
= − 1tf · tf
= −1
(39)
for i = 1, 2. Substituting (39) into (38) we have
∂V
∂x · f(x,u∗P ,u∗E) = −F2F1−F2
(− 1)+ F1F1−F2 (− 1)
= −1
and we can write
1 + ∂V∂x · f(x,u∗P ,u∗E) = 1− 1 = 0 (40)
which means that the HJI equation is satisfied by the Value
function in Region Rs. 
Remark. The Value function (22) determines the capture
time when using the normalized (by vE) speeds. In the case
where vE 6= 1 the Value of the game is simply scaled
by 1/vE to obtain the real capture time. We work with
normalized speeds since the constant factor 1/vE does not
change the results in this paper.
In summary, a solution of the 2P1EDG was proposed
and the Value function was obtained. In this section we
have verified that the Value function is continuous and
continuously differentiable over R. It was also shown that
the candidate Value function satisfies the HJI equation for
any x ∈ R. All this together plus the uniqueness property
of the Value function verifies that the proposed solution and
the candidate Value function are in fact the solution of the
Two-Pursuer One-Evader Differential Game.
D. Dispersal Surface and Multi-Pursuer Multi-Evader Dif-
ferential Game
The existence of a dispersal surface was discussed in
Section IV-C and the condition is given by the distance from
the Evader’s position to each one of the two intersection
of the Apollonius circles. We illustrate the game’s dispersal
surface through an example.
Consider the initial positions: E = (5, 0), P1 = (0, 0),
P2 = (24,−4). The players’ speeds are: vE = 1, vP1 = 1.25,
vP2 = 1.3125. Initially, there exist two sets of solutions
that satisfy the optimality conditions; the two intersection
points are at the same distance from the Evader’s position
and the state of the game is located on the singular surface
of dispersal type, that is, x ∈ D. In general, since there are
more than one optimal solution and the each team does not
know what strategy the opponent will implement, then two
cases may occur: both teams choose the same solution or
each team chooses a different solution. In the former case
the state of the game stays on the dispersal surface and
more than one solution is optimal. However, when teams
choose different solutions then the state of the game leaves
the dispersal surface and transitions into a regular region of
the state space where only one optimal solution exists, hence,
no dilemma exists any longer. Typically, Pursuers pay an
infinitesimally small price for guessing incorrectly.
In this example each team makes a choice at the beginning
of the game and it happens that they selected opposite
solutions, the Pursuers initially head south whereas the
Evader heads North. Because the players did not choose
the same strategy, the state of the game leaves the dispersal
surface and it transitions into the regular subspace R. After
measuring the Evader’s new position, the Pursuers recompute
the solution of the game; now it holds that x ∈ R−s ⊂ R.
Fig. 5 shows the resulting trajectories. This problem illus-
trates a typical scenario in pursuit-evasion differential games
where the pursuers generally see a small cost increment by
incorrectly choosing between two or more strategies. This is
inevitable in practice since the Evader will not announce its
strategy and the Pursuers will pay a price for the state of
the game to leave the dispersal surface and enter a regular
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Fig. 5. Optimal Trajectories
subspace. The unlikely outcome where both teams choose
the same strategy for all 0 ≤ t ≤ tf was referred by Isaacs
as the perpetual dilemma [3].
We have shown that the time of capture of a fleeing Evader
can be reduced when two Pursuers work cooperatively as
a team compared to the single Pursuer case. We can use
the state feedback solution of the 2P1EDG in order to
approximate the solution for a Multi-Pursuer Multi-Evader
Differential Game, where, in addition of taking advantage of
the cooperative behavior by the Pursuers, it is also necessary
to assign teams of Pursuers to capture each Evader. The
objective is to minimize the capture time of the last Evader
where each Pursuer has to be assigned to one and only
one Evader. Let us consider an example with five Pursuers
and three Evaders where the speeds and initial positions of
the five Pursuers are vP = {1.3, 1.18, 1.2, 1.05, 1.1} and
P = {(3, 9), (1, 5), (0, 0), (0.5,−3), (1.5,−7)}, respectively.
The initial positions and speeds of the three Evaders are
vE = {0.98, 0.85, 0.76} and E = {(8, 5), (10, 1), (7,−3)},
respectively.
In this example we consider assignments of teams 2−2−1.
We do not consider cases where three Pursuers may be
assigned to a single Evader. Under these conditions we obtain
the combination of possible assignments shown in Table I,
where each numerical entry denotes the Value of the Game
for the 2P1EDG combination PiPjEl and the superscript
denotes which case is active under such combination, that
is, if the Evader will be captured only by Pi, only by
Pj , or simultaneously by both Pursuers. A given Pursuer
can be assigned to capture only one Evader which imposes
constraints on the selection of assignments; if for instance,
P1 is assigned to E1, either alone or teaming up with P5,
then it cannot be assigned to E2 (or E3) and the best time
to capture E2 would be 28.46. Similarly, if P1 is assigned
either to E2 or E3, then it cannot be used to capture E1 and
the best time to capture E1 would be 35.00.
The best assignment strategy is {P1E1}, {P2P3E2},
{P4P5E3} corresponding to the capture times 20.01, 28.46,
and 19.97, respectively. All Evaders have been captured at
28.46 time units and no other combination can reduce this
TABLE I
POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF ASSIGNMENTS Pi, Pj , El FOR
i, j = 1, ..., 5 AND l = 1, 2, 3. THE SUPERSCRIPT DENOTES THE ACTIVE
CASE
Pi, Pj - El 1 2 3
1,2 20.01(1) 23.62(1) 23.36(s)
1,3 20.01(1) 23.33(s) 17.31(3)
1,4 20.01(1) 23.62(1) 20.18(s)
1,5 20.00(s) 22.92(s) 16.34(s)
2,3 35.00(2) 28.46(s) 17.31(3)
2,4 35.00(2) 29.84(2) 21.41(s)
2,5 35.00(2) 29.68(s) 17.66(s)
3,4 42.88(3) 28.71(3) 17.31(3)
3,5 42.88(3) 28.71(3) 16.75(s)
4,5 113.73(5) 46.69(5) 19.97(s)
value.
V. ACTIVE TARGET DEFENSE DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
(ATDDG)
A. Overview
Target Defense Differential Games (TDDG) are recently
introduced pursuit-evasion differential games with three
agents. A target (T ) is pursued by an agent called the attacker
(A). A third player, the Defender (D) pursues A in an effort
to defend T . The outcome of the three-player game is simple:
If D intercepts A before A captures T , then the Target is
successfully defended; however, if A captures T before D
can intercept A, then the defense is unsuccessful and A is
the winner. When the target is able to maneuver in the three-
player game, then T and D cooperate while playing against
A and this scenario is known as the Active Target Defense
Differential Game (ATDDG). Fig. 6 describes the geometry
used to describe ATDDGs [91], [92].
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Fig. 6. Defender-Attacker-Target Geometry describing the Active Target
Defense Differential Games where the Defender pursues the Attacker who
pursues the actively maneuvering Target, [91], [92].
There exist a number of popular performance metrics
which are used when posing the ATDDG. In games of kind,
the interest lies with the outcome of the defense: does the
Target succeed in evading the attacker or is captured? In
games of degree, when the target escapes, the range from
the attacker to the target at the instant when the attacker
is intercepted by the defender has been used. When the
target is captured by the Attacker, the distance between the
defender and attacker at the instant of capture of the Target
by the Attacker has been used as a performance metric.
These ranging metrics are popular because they quantify the
outcome of the engagement and are readily computed. Other
metrics, such as time to capture, are also of interest.
The two-players one target game of [93] is an early version
of target defense. In the paper, a two-player differential game
is played wherein one of the players wants the state of
the system to reach a target, while the other player wants
the state of the system to avoid this target. Introduced by
Boyell, the defense of a ship from an incoming torpedo using
a counter-weapon was described, [94], [95]. The authors
of [96], [97] proposed the defense of an active target by
launching a defensive missile. Rubinsky and Gutman pre-
sented an analysis of the end-game ATDDG scenario based
on the Attacker-Target miss distance for a non-cooperative
Target-Defender. The authors develop linearization-based
Attacker maneuvers in order to evade the Defender and
continue pursuing the Target using the LQ paradigm, [98],
[99]. Defense of non-maneuverable aircraft was addressed in
[100], [101]. In [102], the limiting values of the three partic-
ipants optimal strategies are studied as the quadratic weight
on the defending missiles acceleration command tends to
zero. They show that in the limit, the intercepting missiles
and the targets optimal strategies are identical in form to
that obtained in the game without the defending missile.
Ratnoo and Shima proposed a game theoretic analysis of
the ATDDG problem using conventional guidance laws for
both attacker and defender, [103], [104]. The cooperative
strategies proposed by [105] allowed for a maneuverability
disadvantage of the Defender with respect to the Attacker and
the results show that the optimal target maneuver is either
constant or arbitrary. The authors of [106] implemented a
Multiple Model Adaptive Estimator (MMAE) to identify
the guidance law and parameters of incoming missiles and
optimize defender strategies to minimize the control effort.
In [107] the three-agent game using zero-effort-miss (ZEM)
is investigated.
The ATDDG has been addressed in great detail in [51],
[52], [91], [92], [108]–[110]. The ATDDG was analyzed
in [51], [52] using simple motion kinematics. In order to
find the optimal strategy for the Defender to intercept the
Attacker, the geometric concept of the Apollonius circle is
used. In this analysis, the authors are able to look at the
critical Target/Attacker speed ratio to ensure target survival.
The authors of [108] considered the use of two defenders
to better engage the attacker. The work in [110] investigated
the case where the Defender had a non-zero capture radius.
While in previous work, information between all players was
shared, the work in [91], [109] was concerned with optimal
evasion of the target assuming the defender’s and attacker’s
control laws were proportional navigation and pure pursuit,
respectively. Information was restricted to the Attacker and
Defender, and heading rate constraints were imposed on the
Target. Finally, in [92], an Extended Kalman Filter was used
to investigate the same engagement with sensor models.
B. Problem Formulation
The scenario of active target defense considers three play-
ers: a Target (T ), an Attacker (A), and a Defender (D) which
have “simple motion” a` la Isaacs. The game is played in the
Euclidean plane where the controls of T , A, and D are their
respective instantaneous headings φ, χ, and ψ and their states
are specified by their Cartesian coordinates xT = (xT , yT ),
xA = (xA, yA), and xD = (xD, yD). The players T , A
and D have constant speeds denoted by VT , VA, and VD,
respectively. The complete state of the TAD differential game
is specified by x := (xT , yT , xA, yA, xD, yD) ∈ R6. The
game set is the entire space R6. The initial time is denoted
by t0 and the corresponding initial state of the system is
x0 := (xT0 , yT0 , xA0 , yA0 , xD0 , yD0) = x(t0). The Target
aircraft is slower than the Attacker missile, and thus the
speed ratio α = VT /VA < 1. We assume that the Attacker
and Defender have similar capabilities, so VA = VD. Without
loss of generality, the players’ speeds are normalized so that
VA = VD = 1 and VT = α.
The control input of the T/D team is the pair of instan-
taneous headings uT,D = {φ, ψ}. The Attacker’s control is
his instantaneous heading angle, uA = {χ}. The dynamics
x˙ = f(x,uA,uT,D) are specified by the system of ordinary
differential equations
x˙A = cosχ, xA(0) = xA0
y˙A = sinχ, yA(0) = yA0
x˙D = cosψ, xD(0) = xD0
y˙D = sinψ, yD(0) = yD0
x˙T = α cosφ, xT (0) = xT0
y˙T = α sinφ, yT (0) = yT0
(41)
where the admissible controls are given by χ, φ, ψ ∈ [−pi, pi].
Both, the state and the controls, are unconstrained. The
terminal condition is point capture, that is, the separation
between Target and Attacker becomes zero allowing the
Attacker to capture the Target and win the game. An alter-
native termination condition is when the separation between
Attacker and Defender is equal to zero; this case represents
interception of the Attacker by the Defender and the T/D
team wins. Hence, the termination set for the complete TAD
differential game is
S := Se
⋃
Sc (42)
where
Se :=
{
x |
√
(xA − xD)2 + (yA − yD)2 = 0
}
(43)
represents interception of the Attacker by the Defender (and
the Target escapes) and
Sc :=
{
x |
√
(xA − xT )2 + (yA − yT )2 = 0
}
(44)
represents the opposite outcome where the Attacker wins by
capturing the Target.
In this paper the focus is on the Game of Degree when
(43) applies. In such a case the cost functional is given by
Jc(uA(t),uB(t), x˜0) :=
1
2
[(xAf − xTf )2 + (yAf − yTf )2]
(45)
subject to the terminal condition (43).
The next two sections summarize the approach described
in [111] where a reduced state space is used to derive
the optimal strategies of the escape game. Without loss of
generalization, it is assumed that xD = −xA, yA = 0,
yD = 0, and yT ≥ 0; the scenario is as shown in Fig.
7. The selected reduced state space is a suitable choice of
framework for this particular problem. Other choices such
as a framework based on relative distances is common in
other games. In general, the main purpose is to simplify the
analysis by reducing the dimension of the system.
C. Game of Kind
The concept of Game of Kind is fundamental in differ-
ential games and, given the initial conditions and problem
parameters, its solution provides the answer to the question
of which team wins the game.
In the ATDDG and employing the reduced state space
x = (xA, xT , yT ) we have that when xT < 0 the Target can
escape. When xT > 0 the state space is partitioned into two
regions: Re and Rc. The region Re is the set of states such
that if the Target’s initial position (xT , yT ) and the coordinate
xA are such that (xA, xT , yT ) ∈ Re, then, the Target is
guaranteed to escape the Attacker, provided the Target and
the Defender team implement their optimal strategies φ∗ and
ψ∗. The Game of Degree, that is, the ATDDG, is played in
Re. The region Rc specifies the states where under optimal
Attacker play, notwithstanding the presence of the Defender,
the Target cannot escape.
For a specified speed ratio 0 < α < 1, the equation
α =
√
(xA + xT )2 + y2T −
√
(xA − xT )2 + y2T
2xA
(46)
renders the boundary in the state space (xA, xT , yT ),
xT , xA > 0, where the active target defense game of degree
is played out, and as such this boundary constitutes the
solution to the Game of Kind.
Proposition 2: [111]. For a given speed ratio 0 < α < 1
the region of win of the Attacker is
Rc = {(xA, xT , yT )|xA > 0, xT > 0, yT ≥ 0,
x2A +
y2T
1− α2 −
x2T
α2
< 0}.
The manifold B in R3 which is the boundary of the set Re
for which the Target is guaranteed to escape is
B = {(xA, xT , yT )|xA > 0, xT > 0, yT ≥ 0,
x2A +
y2T
1− α2 −
x2T
α2
= 0}.
and the region of win of the T & D team where the ATDDG
is played is
Re = {(xA, xT , yT )|xA ≥ 0, xT ≥ 0, yT ≥ 0,
x2A+
y2T
1−α2−
x2T
α2
> 0} ∪ {(xA, xT , yT )|xA ≥ 0, xT ≤ 0}.
Thus, for a fixed xA > 0, the xA-cross section of B which
divides the reduced state space into the two regions Re and
Rc is the right branch of the hyperbola (where, xT > 0)
x2T
α2x2A
− y
2
T
(1− α2)x2A
= 1. (47)
D. Game of Degree
In the following Theorem, the “two-sided” PMP is used in
order to synthesize the players’ optimal strategies. This prob-
lem illustrates how the necessary conditions for optimality
or PMP can be used to obtain the regular solution of this
differential game where T and D cooperate to maximize the
terminal range while A aims at minimizing it.
Theorem 3: Consider the ATDDG (41)-(45). The problem
parameter is the speed ratio 0 ≤ α < 1 and the reduced
state space, is (xA, xT , yT ) where, without loss of generality,
xA > 0 and yT ≥ 0. In the part of the state space where
the Target can escape, the optimal headings of the Attacker,
the Target, and the Defender are given by the state feedback
control laws
cosφ∗ = ± xT√
x2T+(yT−y)2
sinφ∗ = ± yT−y√
x2T+(yT−y)2
for xT 6= 0.
cosχ∗ = − xA√
x2A+y
2
, sinχ∗ = y√
x2A+y
2
.
cosψ∗ = xA√
x2A+y
2
, sinψ∗ = y√
x2A+y
2
.
(48)
where y is a real solution of the quartic equation
(1−α2)y4 − 2(1−α2)yT y3+[
(1−α2)y2T +x2A−α2x2T
]
y2−2x2AyT y+x2Ay2T =0 (49)
which is parameterized by the speed ratio 0 ≤ α < 1. The
quartic equation has two real solutions y1 and y2 and y1 ≤
yT ≤ y2. In eqs. (48) when xT ≤ 0 the solution y1 is
selected and when xT > 0 the solution y2 is used. Also,
when xT < 0, the sign in the Target heading in eq. (48) is
positive and, when xT > 0, the sign in the Target heading is
negative. Finally, when xT = 0, the Target’s optimal heading,
φ∗, is given by
φ∗ = ϕ∗ + pi/2 (50)
where
tanϕ∗ =
√
x2A + (1− α2)y2T
αyT
. (51)
Proof. The optimal control inputs in terms of the co-
state variables are obtained from Isaacs’ Main Equation 1
minφ,ψ maxχH = 0 and they are characterized by
cosχ∗ = λxA√
λ2xA
+λ2yA
, sinχ∗ = λyA√
λ2xA
+λ2yA
cosψ∗ = − λxD√
λ2xD
+λ2yD
, sinψ∗ = − λyD√
λ2xD
+λ2yD
cosφ∗ = − λxT√
λ2xT
+λ2yT
, sinφ∗ = − λyT√
λ2xT
+λ2yT
.
Fig. 7. Optimal Headings of the Target, the Attacker, and the Defender
Additionally, the co-state dynamics are λ˙xA = λ˙yA = λ˙xD =
λ˙yD = λ˙xT = λ˙yT = 0. Hence, all co-states are constant
and we have that χ∗ ≡ constant, ψ∗ ≡ constant, and φ∗ ≡
constant. In other words, the regular optimal trajectories are
straight lines.
Concerning the solution of the attendant Two-Point
Boundary Value Problem (TPBVP) on 0 ≤ t ≤ tf in R12,
we have 6 initial states specified by (41) and we need 6 more
conditions for the terminal time tf . In this respect, define the
augmented Mayer terminal value function Φa : R6 → R1
Φa(xf ) := 12 [(xA(tf )− xT (tf ))2 + (yA(tf )− yT (tf ))2]
+ν1(xA(tf )− xD(tf )) + ν2(yA(tf )− yD(tf ))
where ν1 and ν2 are Lagrange multipliers. The PMP or Dy-
namic Programming yields the transversality/terminal condi-
tions λ(tf ) = − ∂∂x Φa(xf ), that is,
λxA = xT (tf )− xA(tf )− ν1 (52)
λyA = yT (tf )− yA(tf )− ν2 (53)
λxD = ν1 (54)
λyD = ν2 (55)
λxT = xA(tf )− xT (tf ) (56)
λyT = yA(tf )− yT (tf ) (57)
At this point, we have that equations (52)-(57) together with
the terminal equations
xA = xD, yA = yD. (58)
yield 8 conditions. Since we need only 6 conditions we
eliminate the introduced Lagrange multipliers ν1 and ν2 from
equations (52)-(57) and we obtain
λxA + λxD = xT (tf )− xA(tf ) (59)
λyA + λyD = yT (tf )− yA(tf ) (60)
Finally, the time tf is specified by the PMP requirement that
the Hamiltonian H(x(t), λ(t), χ, ψ, φ)|tf ≡ 0.
Because the optimal trajectories of A, D, and T are
straight lines and VD = VA we have that
xA(tf ) = 0 (61)
xD(tf ) = 0 (62)
yA(tf ) = yD(tf ) (63)
Let y := yA(tf ) = yD(tf ). Also, let xA = xA(t′), xT =
xT (t
′), and yT = yT (t′) be the instantaneous positions at
some time t′ < tf . Hence, from equations (41) we obtain
the following
xT (tf ) = xT + α · (tf − t′) cosφ, (64)
yT (tf ) = yT + α · (tf − t′) sinφ, (65)
0 = xA + (tf − t′) cosχ, (66)
y = (tf − t′) sinχ, (67)
0 = −xA + (tf − t′) cosψ, (68)
y = (tf − t′) sinψ, (69)
In addition, equations (56)-(60) can be written as follows
λxT = −xT (tf ) (70)
λyT = y − yT (tf ) (71)
λxA + λxD = xT (tf ) (72)
λyA + λyD = yT (tf )− y (73)
Consider eq. (11) and eqs. (70) and (71). We calculate the
following
cosφ∗ = xT (tf )√
x2T (tf )+(y−yT (tf ))2
sinφ∗ = yT (tf )−y√
x2T (tf )+(y−yT (tf ))2
.
(74)
Hence, in light of eqs. (64) and (65), we have that the optimal
heading angle of T is φ∗ = ξ where the angle ξ is shown
in Fig. 7. The three points, T , Tf , and y are collinear and
the optimal geometry is as shown in Fig. 7 where Tf =
(xT (tf ), yT (tf )). From the 4ADy in Fig. 7 we conclude
that tf − t′ =
√
x2A + y
2. Without loss of generality, assume
that t′ = 0, then
tf =
√
x2A + y
2. (75)
Thus, using Isaacs’ method, we are now able to reduce the
solution of the zero-sum differential game of degree to the
optimization of a cost/payoff function of one variable. From
(64)-(69), (74), and (75) we can write the cost (the terminal
distance between A and T ) as J(y;xA, xT , yT ) = TTf±TI ,
where TTf = αAI = αtf . Depending on which side of the
orthogonal bisector of the segment AD the Target is located
we have the two cases:
For case a) where xT < 0 solve miny J1 where
J1 = α
√
x2A + y
2 +
√
(yT − y)2 + x2T . (76)
For case b) where xT > 0 solve maxy J2 where
J2 = α
√
x2A + y
2 −
√
(y − yT )2 + x2T . (77)
Also, from eq. (74) we have that in case a)
cosφ∗ = xT√
x2T+(yT−y)2
, sinφ∗ = yT−y√
x2T+(yT−y)2 (78)
and in case b)
cosφ∗ = − xT√
x2T+(y−yT )2
, sinφ∗= y−yT√
x2T+(y−yT )2 (79)
The A and D optimal headings are
cosχ∗ = − xA√
x2A + y
2
, sinχ∗ =
y√
x2A + y
2
. (80)
cosψ∗ =
xA√
x2A + y
2
, sinψ∗ =
y√
x2A + y
2
. (81)
Let us now use eqs. (10) and (81) to write the following
relationships
− λxD√
λ2xD
+λ2yD
= xA√
x2A+y
2
, − λyD√
λ2xD
+λ2yD
= y√
x2A+y
2
.
(82)
Similarly, from eqs. (9) and (80) we obtain
λxA√
λ2xA
+λ2yA
= − xA√
x2A+y
2
,
λyA√
λ2xA
+λ2yA
= y√
x2A+y
2
.
(83)
We have four equations (59), (60), (82), and (83) in the four
unknowns λxA , λyA , λxD , and λyD . The solution is
λxA =
1
2
[xT (tf )− xA(tf )− xA
y
(
yT (tf )− yA(tf )
)
]
λyA =
1
2
[yT (tf )− yA(tf )− y
xA
(
xT (tf )− xA(tf )
)
]
λxD =
1
2
[xT (tf )− xA(tf ) + xA
y
(
yT (tf )− yA(tf )
)
]
λyD =
1
2
[yT (tf )− yA(tf ) + y
xA
(
xT (tf )− xA(tf )
)
]
By substituting yA(tf ) = y and xA(tf ) = 0 we obtain
λxA =
1
2
[xT (tf )− xA
y
(
yT (tf )− y
)
] (84)
λyA =
1
2
[yT (tf )− y − y
xA
xT (tf )] (85)
λxD =
1
2
[xT (tf ) +
xA
y
(
yT (tf )− y
)
] (86)
λyD =
1
2
[yT (tf )− y + y
xA
xT (tf )] (87)
which together with eqs. (70) and (71) specify the co-states
in terms of the states at time tf . Now, eqs. (64), (65), (75),
and (78) yield
a)

xT (tf ) =
[
1 + α
√
x2A+y
2√
x2T+(yT−y)2
]
xT
yT (tf ) =
[
1 + α
√
x2A+y
2√
x2T+(yT−y)2
]
(yT−y)+y
(88)
Similarly, eqs. (64), (65), (75), and (79) yield
b)

xT (tf ) =
[
1− α
√
x2A+y
2√
x2T+(y−yT )2
]
xT
yT (tf ) =
[
1− α
√
x2A+y
2√
x2T+(y−yT )2
]
(yT−y)+y
(89)
Inserting eqs. (88) and (89) into eqs. (70), (71), and (84)-(87)
allows us to express the co-states in terms of y (or tf ):
λxT = −
[
1± α
√
x2A+y
2√
x2T+(yT−y)2
]
xT
λyT = −
[
1± α
√
x2A+y
2√
x2T+(yT−y)2
]
(yT − y)
λxA =
1
2
[
1± α
√
x2A+y
2√
x2T+(yT−y)2
]
(xA + xT − xA yTy )
λyA =
1
2
[
1± α
√
x2A+y
2√
x2T+(yT−y)2
]
[yT − (1 + xTxA )y]
λxD =
1
2
[
1± α
√
x2A+y
2√
x2T+(yT−y)2
]
(xT − xA + xA yTy )
λyD =
1
2
[
1± α
√
x2A+y
2√
x2T+(yT−y)2
]
[yT − (1− xTxA )y]
(90)
We now used the condition on the Hamiltonian at the
terminal time in conjunction with eqs. (78)-(81) for the
optimal controls and eq. (90) for the co-states. Doing so we
obtain the following
− 12 (xA + xT − xA yTy ) xA√x2A+y2
+ 12 [yT − (1 + xTxA )y]
y√
x2A+y
2
+ 12 (xT − xA + xA yTy ) xA√x2A+y2
+ 12 [yT − (1− xTxA )y]
y√
x2A+y
2
+ α√
x2T+(yT−y)2
[x2T + (yT − y)2] = 0
⇒ −x2A + x2A yTy + yT y − y2
+α
√
x2A+y
2√
x2T+(yT−y)2
[x2T + (yT − y)2] = 0
⇒ (x2A + y2 − x2A yTy − yT y)2
= α2(x2A + y
2)[x2T + (yT − y)2]
⇒ (1− yTy )2(x2A + y2) = α2[x2T + (yT − y)2]
Finally, grouping terms in y we obtain (49), that is, the
optimal aimpoint on the orthogonal bisector of AD specified
by y∗ is a real solution of the quartic equation (49).
For the derivation of the Target strategy when xT = 0,
please refer to [111]. 
The verification of the saddle-point strategies of the
ATTDG in the escape region was recently provided in
[112]. Preliminary results and a candidate solution for the
ATDDG in the capture region have been presented in [113];
verification of these strategies is a topic of current research.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Pursuit-evasion differential games, initially introduced by
Rufus Isaacs, have been studied in great detail over the
past half-century. Since its inception, many ideas and tech-
niques have been developed to gain a better understanding
of pursuit-evasion differential games. In his seminal work,
Isaacs motivated and described the idea of posing problems
in a game-theoretic framework; the dynamics are mathemat-
ically described by differential equations so he called this
approach “Differential Games”. Using differential games,
problems of pursuit-evasion have been properly described
and solved. The contributions of Rufus Isaacs, Richard Bell-
man, John Breakwell and his students, and Lev S. Pontryagin
were highlighted in this paper. A description of different
categories of pursuit-evasion differential games and signif-
icant contributions were provided with examples. Classic
games such as the “Homicidal Chauffeur” Differential Game
and “Two-Cars” Differential Game were briefly discussed.
Games involving N-pursuers-1-evader, 1-pursuer-M-evaders,
and N-pursuer-M-evaders were addressed. In games with
multiple players, cooperation between members of the same
team was emphasized. Not only cooperation improves team
performance but it was shown that cooperative behaviors are
necessary to synthesize saddle-point equilibrium strategies.
Two pursuit-evasion problems involving multiple players
were presented and they were formulated as differential
games. The solutions provided in this paper highlighted the
cooperative aspect and the methods available by applying
differential game theory.
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